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Abstract 
Conditionalities – i.e. ‘exchanging finance for policy reform’ in an asymmetrical 
relationship between the ‘donor’ and the ‘recipient’ – are central mechanisms of the 
reform programmes of international financial institutions (IFIs). As they are imposed by 
outside entities, they can also be viewed as ‘policy externalisation’, which is 
paradoxically a massive intrusion in the shaping of a country’s domestic policies. The 
resilience of such devices is remarkable, however. Indeed, in the early 1980s, many 
developing countries were facing balance of payments difficulties and called upon these 
international financial institutions for financial relief. In exchange for this relief, they 
devised economic reforms (fiscal, financial, monetary), which were the conditions for 
their lending. These reforms were not associated with better economic performance, and 
this led the IFIs to devise in the 1990s different reforms, which this time targeted the 
functioning of the government and its ‘governance’, economic problems being explained 
by governments’ characteristics (e.g., rent-seekers). The paper demonstrates the 
limitations of the device of conditionality, which is a crucial theoretical and policy issue 
given its stability across time and countries. These limitations stem from: i) the concept 
of conditionality per se - the mechanism of exchanging finance for reform; ii) the contents 
of the prescribed reforms given developing countries economic structure (typically 
commodity-based export structures) and the weakness of the concept of ‘governance’ in 
view of these countries’ political economies; and iii) the intrinsic linkages between 
economic and political conditionalities, whose limitations thus retroact on each other, in 
particular regarding effectiveness and credibility.  
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Conditionalities – i.e. ‘exchanging finance for policy reform’ in an intrinsically 
asymmetrical relationship between the ‘donor’ and the ‘recipient’ – are central 
mechanisms of the reform programmes of international financial institutions (IFIs) (or 
now an economic union such as the European Union). As these conditionalities are 
imposed by outside entities to a government, they can also be viewed as ‘policy 
externalisation’. Paradoxically, such externalisation is simultaneously a massive intrusion 
in the shaping of a country’s domestic policies and therefore in its sovereignty over its 
own public policies (while this sovereignty is definitional of a state). Policy 
externalisation and the associated conditionalities on reform programmes are likely to 
meet deep resistance from recipient countries - civil societies and governments -, create 
divisions between the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ (sometimes deliberately), and have often 
ended in failure. Well-known examples are the tensions generated by the ex-‘troika’ 
programmes devised for Southern Europe since 2010, and particularly in Greece. 
The resilience of such devices - conditional lending and policy externalisation - 
over the ‘longue durée’ is remarkable. The reform programmes required by the ex-‘troika’ 
from Southern Europe countries - and more generally by international lenders vis-à-vis 
countries affected by analogous macroeconomic problems - are thus strikingly similar to 
those that have been prescribed to developing countries, notably in Sub-Saharan Africa 
from the 1980s onwards (despite obvious differences, stemming from, e.g., different 
monetary systems). Sub-Saharan African countries have been said to be ‘experimentation 
laboratories’ of such reforms, and as similar causes induce similar effects, conditionalities 
triggered much resistance from African governments and societies.  
Indeed, in the early 1980s, a great number of developing countries were facing 
severe terms of trade shocks and therefore balance of payments difficulties, which 
stemmed from a significant drop in the prices of the primary commodities exported by 
these countries. They called upon the international financial institutions (IFIs, the IMF 
and the World Bank) for financial relief – being members of these institutions, and 
financial assistance being an element of the mandate of the IMF vis-à-vis its members. In 
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exchange for their financial assistance (made of credits and loans), which at this time was 
thought to be temporary, the IFIs devised a set of economic reforms that these countries 
should implement, typically targeting fiscal, financial and monetary issues. These reforms 
were the conditions for their lending and were later summarised as the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ - paradigmatic examples being, among others, stabilisation and adjustment 
programmes, and compulsory compliance with a wide range of indicators, as in IFIs debt 
sustainability assessments. During the 1980s and 1990s, however, this forced 
externalisation of domestic policies to external agencies (the IFIs) and the prescribed 
reforms were not associated with better economic performance. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 
for example, these decades were even coined ‘the lost decades in spite of policy reform’ 
(Easterly, 2001), and the resumption of growth in the 2000s stemmed less from the 
implementation of IFIs reforms than from global processes on which Sub-Saharan 
African countries (and IFIs policies) have limited control (e.g., China’s growth and 
subsequent high commodity prices).  
Instead of drawing lessons and questioning the reforms’ conceptual framework or 
the mechanism of conditional lending, on the contrary this mixed economic success in 
the 1990s led the IFIs to deepen and extend the domains of conditionalities to the 
functioning of the government of the developing country in difficulty, and to devise 
additional reforms, this time targeting its ‘governance’. The underlying theoretical 
framework here was that the economic problems of developing countries also stemmed 
from the characteristics of governments – being, e.g., rent-seekers, plagued by corruption 
and whose policies are ‘captured’ by interest groups, in line with the theories of public 
choice or those of ‘positive political economy’.  
The paper elaborates a critical analysis of conditional lending, and through the 
comparison of these two sets of conditionalities (economic and ‘governance’ 
conditionalities), it demonstrates their respective limitations, which explain their 
recurrent failure. Such an argumentation is particularly crucial given the stability of 
conditionality, conditional lending and exchange of finance for reform as a financing 
mechanism for international lending agencies – across time and space and whatever the 
outcomes, e.g., for African or Latin American countries in the 1980s or European 
countries in the 2010s. These inherent limitations of conditionality are examined via 
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examples from developing countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa since the 1980s, 
and in the light of the current theoretical debates on the inaccuracy of IFIs policy reforms, 
aid ineffectiveness and the integration of the political economy of developing countries 
in the understanding of their economic performance.  
The paper thus shows that the limitations of conditionality stem from: i) the 
concept of conditionality per se (the mechanism of ‘exchanging finance for reform’), as 
conditionality and ‘policy externalisation’ express sheer power relationships and generate 
asymmetric ‘games’ perpetuating conditionality despite its failure; ii) the reforms 
prescribed in exchange for financing (summarised as the ‘Washington Consensus’, or 
‘orthodoxy’, or ‘neoliberalism’) and the theoretical flaws of their underlying conceptual 
framework (even more inaccurate for economies that are typically based on the export of 
commodities), as well as the theoretical weakness of the concept of ‘governance’ in view 
of developing countries’ political economies; and iii) the intrinsic linkages between 
economic and political conditionalities, whose limitations thus retroact on each other, in 
particular regarding conditionalities’ effectiveness and credibility – among other 
linkages, the power asymmetry that is constitutive of conditionality paradoxically 
nullifies the latter’s apparent technical rationale and the credibility of sanctions for 
noncompliance. 
The paper is structured as follows. Firstly, it explains the main features of the 
conditionalities attached what has been coined as the ‘Washington consensus’. Secondly, 
the paper examines the context and elements of the conditionalities that focus on the 
concept of ‘governance’. Thirdly, it shows the limitations of conditional lending, both 
inherent to conditionality itself and those stemming from the economic and political 
economy characteristics of the countries to which economic and ‘governance’ 
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1. CONDITIONALITIES AS THE ‘EXCHANGE OF FINANCE FOR 
ECONOMIC REFORM’: THE REFORMS OF THE 
‘WASHINGTON CONSENSUS’ AS A PARADGIMATIC 
EXAMPLE  
 
1.1. THE CONCEPTUAL PREMISES OF THE ‘WASHINGTON CONSENSUS’ 
AND THEIR DIFFERENT FORMS  
 
The ‘Washington consensus’ and attached conditionalities can be understood only 
in their context, in particular the evolution of the theories of the desirable role of the state 
and those of the public policies that are effective in developing countries. These 
evolutions closely follow the evolution of development economics theories since WWII, 
and have been subject to drastic changes (Adelman, 2000a). Indeed, after WWII, 
developing countries pursued a resource intensive development strategy with limited 
industrialisation. In some East Asian countries – the so-called ‘developmental states’, 
Japan, Korea, Taiwan -, governments implemented with spectacular success a mix of 
government and market and ‘entrepreneurial’ policies, where the state helped the 
functioning of markets (in providing the legal framework, infrastructure, and if necessary 
being an entrepreneur in last resort) (Aoki et al., 1996; Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990). 
Developmental states promoted industrialisation via targeted policies (incentives, 
subsidies, tariffs, policies towards labour markets, technology, etc.). These states showed 
that opposing states to markets is a fallacy. ‘Developmental state’ governments displayed 
a capacity for implementing public policies, and, moreover credible policies.  
From 1940 to 1979, the early theorists of development - Arthur Lewis, Paul 
Rosenstein-Rodan, Albert Hirschman, among others - viewed government as a prime 
mover and the only entity able to reallocate factors of production from a low-productivity 
sector (traditional) to a high-productivity sector (industrial) with increasing returns, to 
correct coordination failures, and to move the economy out of low-level equilibrium traps. 
Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), in particular, highlighted the importance of spillover effects, 
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the possibility of coordination failures in developing countries and of poverty traps, which 
justified government intervention. The creation of complementarities (in demand, in 
markets) was viewed as crucial for development, which could not happen if left only to 
private sector (Matsuyama, 1997). In this regard, industrialisation had to be planned by 
the state. 
From the early 1980s onwards, the neoclassical paradigm progressively became 
preeminent in the economic theoretical literature as well as in development policy 
agencies. Instead of the many determinants of development defended by the first theorist 
after WWII (e.g., path dependence processes, non-linearities, low physical capital), these 
theories isolated single causalities that would explain economic stagnation, and state 
intervention has been seen as ineffective (Adelman, 2000b). The state became viewed as 
fostering rent-seeking, corruption and predation. Hence the best policies for development 
were those promoting a limited state, e.g. trade barriers, here viewed as creating an anti-
export bias, which was the real cause of balance of payments problems. The best 
incentives provided by public policies regarding the allocation of resources are, in this 
view, the most neutral in terms of discrimination among foreign and domestic markets, 
with international trade being able to be a substitute for low aggregate domestic demand, 
as in, e.g., export-led growth (Adelman, 2001). ‘Getting prices right’ and removing price 
distortions are here the overarching objectives. 
From the 1980s onwards, this paradigm has constituted the basis for the 
programmes of the IFIs, the IMF and the World Bank. The set of policy reforms put 
forward by the IFIs was later coined as the ‘Washington consensus’ by John Williamson 
(1990). Williamson summarised this ‘consensus’ as the recommendation of a list of ten 
reforms: fiscal discipline; reordering public expenditure priorities; tax reform; liberalising 
interest rates; competitive exchange rates; trade liberalisation; liberalisation of inward 
foreign direct investment (but not capital account liberalisation); privatisation; 
deregulation (easing barriers to entry and exit); the establishment of property rights. 
As theoretical thinking also evolved in the 1980s, notably on optimal public 
policies – being irrigated by concepts such as, e.g., market and coordination failure -, the 
‘Washington consensus’ has been subject to debate. The above views have also been 
questioned due to the failure of their implementation in Latin America and in Sub-Saharan 
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Africa (SSA). The 1990s thus witnessed more balanced views of the role of the state, in 
particular at low levels of development: markets may be inefficient in the presence of 
externalities (e.g., leading to oligopolies) and be affected by failures, which may be a 
typical characteristic of low-income developing countries. States may be inefficient in 
terms of allocation of resources, but they may be better than markets in addressing 
externalities and correcting coordination failures that stem from externalities, economies 
of scale, and collective action problems. Markets and states are here viewed as 
complementary. Regarding developing countries, this has inspired what has been coined 
as the ‘Post-Washington consensus’ (Stiglitz, 1997): here the state has the role of 
establishing infrastructure - educational, technological, financial, physical, 
environmental, social, and more specifically promoting education and technology, 
supporting the financial sector, investing in infrastructure, preventing environmental 
degradation, creating and maintaining a social safety net. For Stiglitz, these roles are 
particularly important in developing countries, as in these countries market failures 
(information problems, missing markets) are larger and capacities of government to 
correct them are weaker. 
For its part, the IMF has viewed the role of the state through the lens of its mandate 
since its creation, in particular the surveillance of fiscal deficits, and has therefore a strong 
focus on the public sector in developing countries. In the first stabilisation programmes 
in developing countries in the 1980s, the IMF prescribed a ‘first generation’ of reforms 
of the civil services centred on macroeconomic stabilisation, notably the reduction of the 
wage bill, and in the 1990s, in view of the disappointing results and the above mentioned 
theoretical evolution, it insisted on a ‘second generation’ of reforms of the civil services, 
which were based on improving ‘incentives’ and a ‘high-quality public sector’. The IMF 
also considers that under certain conditions, public investment has positive impacts in 
developing countries (Clark and Rosales, 2013). 
Despite analyses associated with the ‘Post-Washington consensus’ in the 2000s 
and many other studies on the necessary role of the state, the views on the minimal state 
remain pervasive in mainstream economics and IFIs operational thinking – sometimes 
close to an ‘anti-government ideology’ (Krugman, 2008). The rise of China in the 2000s, 
however, has promoted views of the role of the state that are closer to the first phase of 
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development thinking in the aftermath of the WWII, which were coined as the ‘Beijing 
Consensus’. A similar perspective, coined ‘new structural economics’ was advocated 
within the World Bank in the late 2000s by Justin Yifu Lin, then chief economist (2008-
2012) (Lin, 2011). For Lin, economic development requires an industrial upgrading that 
entails large externalities to firms’ transaction costs and returns to capital investment. 
Thus, in addition to an effective market mechanism, the government should play an active 
role in facilitating industrial upgrading and infrastructure. As underscored by Ricardo 
Hausmann (2012) in his comments on Lin, this confirms that development is about 
structural transformation and accumulating more productive knowledge, a process 
exposed to market failures. 
 
1.2. THE CONDITIONALITIES OF THE PROGRAMMES OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (IMF AND WORLD BANK) 
 
The abovementioned views constitute the context of the IFI conceptual framework 
and ground its key conditionalities, which are centred on fiscal balance, monetary 
adjustment (devaluation), liberalisation and privatisation. As is well-known, the IMF 
stabilisation programmes that were implemented from the 1980s onwards in developing 
countries are based on a theoretical relationship between policy targets and 
macroeconomic aggregates, e.g., growth. The underlying model reflects the Monetary 
Approach to the Balance of Payments (or the Jacques Polak’s model, or Financial 
Programming), which was developed in the 1950s within the IMF. 
The model’s main focus – the core of IMF Financial Programming - is the balance 
of payments effects of credit creation by the banking system. The World Bank uses the 
same identities in its model for evaluating debt sustainability. The purpose of the IMF 
monetary model is the integration of monetary, income and balance of payments analysis. 
This model became the basis of the IMF conditionalities applied to its credits. Over time, 
the model was adapted, broadening and deepening of IMF credit arrangements, and 
included new specifications (Agenor, 2004). 
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A typical IMF programme is a set of macroeconomic identities. The IMF 
monetary model consists of a series of macroeconomic accounting identities that link 
growth, inflation, money supply, current account, and budget deficit, with intermediate 
policy targets (e.g., domestic credit to the private sector, reserve accumulation) designed 
to be consistent with macroeconomic targets like growth, current account adjustment, and 
inflation, which are supposed to resolve the country’s difficulties (Polak, 1997; Baqir et 
al., 2003). IMF programmes have the theory of ‘absorption’ as a background: private 
consumption, domestic investment and government expenditure should not be in excess 
in regard to domestic income. This is why IMF stabilisation programmes are focused on 
the reduction of domestic demand and fiscal deficits, on the stabilisation of public 
spending (i.e. wage bill, investment, equipment, maintenance and recurrent costs), and on 
the increase of public revenues, the broadening the tax base, and export growth. Hence 
the mechanisms of an IMF programme are short-term loans to promote balance of 
payments viability and redress fiscal imbalances and other disequilibria involving 
structural impediments to growth: typically a stand-by arrangement with credit available 
in instalments, conditional on the recipient country’s authorities’ agreement to restrict 
macro policies.  
The notions of conditionality and conditional lending are therefore a key feature 
of an IMF programme: for the IMF, conditionality implies that the borrowing government 
‘agrees to adjust its economic policies to overcome the problems that led it to seek 
financial aid’, and loan conditions ‘ensure that the country will be able to repay’ the IMF 
(IMF, 2016a). The disbursement of ‘tranches’ of loans is contingent on the 
implementation of a set of reforms monitored via criteria of performance, i.e. contingent 
on whether the country meets the intermediate policy targets.  
In the 1990s, besides the IMF model itself, theories of credibility and reflections 
on conditionality, together with theories of ‘global public goods’, provided an additional 
justification of IMF conditionality, and, more generally that of IFIs. Via the signing of an 
agreement that conditions finance to the implementation of a set of measures, the IFIs 
give credibility to the poorest countries, which otherwise are not credible vis-à-vis 
international investors (Rodrik, 1995).  
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Despite the implementation of the programmes’ conditionalities, however, growth 
performances remain mixed in many countries, in particular from the early 1980s onwards 
(after the international debt crisis and terms-of-trade shocks that affected developing 
countries, notably Latin American and SSA countries) – ‘the lost decades’ of the 1980s 
and, for SSA, also the 1990s. Lending was prolonged, one programme followed the other, 
conditionalities accumulated and repeated themselves, and as coined by the IMF 
Independent Evaluation Office, some countries became ‘prolonged users’ of IMF 
conditional lending (IMF-IEO, 2002). In the 2010s, certain SSA countries are entering 
into their third decade under IFI programmes. Despite decades of reforms and conditional 
lending, SSA growth and income levels remain low, and are, moreover, characterised by 
a spectacular divergence when compared with the rest of the world: conditionalities did 
not improve economic performances and at best have been inefficient (figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: GDP per capita, Sub-Saharan Africa vs. the world, 1960–2014 (constant 2005 US dollars)
 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators (online), April 2016. 
 
The IMF progressively understood that short-term relief financing in fact 
addressed structural issues: until the early 1980s, IMF conditionality focused on 
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increased, due to the IMF’s growing involvement in low-income and transition countries 
(IMF, 2016a). 
For the IMF, in addition to demand management and stabilisation policies, 
governmental and private practices may impede efficient production of goods and 
services (i.e., supply): this requires changes to the economy, which is to say structural 
policies. Stabilisation policies are important in the short run, because it is easier to alter 
the various components of overall demand for a short time than it is to make a country’s 
resources more productive. Stabilisation policies include taxing and spending actions, and 
changes to interest rates and the money supply. On the longer term, structural changes are 
required to improve aggregate supply. For the IMF, structural policies not only foster 
growth, but also the successful implementation of stabilisation policies. Their areas are 
typically price controls, management of public finances, public sector enterprises, 
financial sector, social safety nets, labour markets, and public institutions and 
governance. The latter refer to government salaries, e.g., in tax administration, which, if 
they are too low, can encourage corruption while employment in the public sector must 
be limited to business needs, or to inefficient legal systems, too complex business 
regulations and tax administration, which are detrimental to business climate, contracts 
enforcement, foreign direct investment and therefore growth (Abdel-Kader, 2013).  
Regarding the World Bank, it was also in the early 1980s that the first adjustment 
programmes were devised and implemented, firstly in SSA countries, and for the same 
reasons as the IMF programmes, i.e. the severe balance-of-payment crises affecting 
commodity-dependent countries, which had been induced by the shocks created by the 
sharp drop in the terms-of-trade due to the fall in commodity prices. The World Bank is 
by mandate more focused on development, on sectoral issues and project financing. 
World Bank programmes’ main elements are privatisation and liberalisation, especially 
financial and trade liberalisation: in particular, the suppression of state subsidies (e.g., 
subsidies to the agricultural sector, or subsidised credit), tariff reduction, dismantling of 
marketing boards (objectives also being ‘getting prices right’ and limiting state 
intervention viewed as distorting prices), in addition to civil service reforms (e.g., in the 
initial programmes, the freezing of recruitment and wages, voluntary incentives-induced 
retirement).  
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Due to the prolonged problems of low-income countries, especially in SSA, the 
1980s witnessed closer coordination between the IMF and the World Bank for these low-
income countries via the devising of joint programmes - the ESAFs/Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Facility, a concessional facility launched in 1987 and conditioned to the 
acceptance by recipient governments of a series of conditionalities. The ESAF 
programmes displayed quantitative macroeconomic benchmarks (monetary, fiscal - 
reduction of fiscal deficits, action on the public spending, contraction of the wage bill and 
numbers of civil servants, reduction of state subsidies and transfers, e.g. to state-owned-
enterprises/SOEs -, international reserves, external debt) and structural benchmarks (e.g., 
reforms of state-owned-enterprises, financial sector, structural fiscal policy, tax and 
expenditure management). The stabilisation programmes of the IMF and the adjustment 
programmes of the World Bank, which support their lending activities, are linked in the 
different models that underlie them – and also in practice at the country level. While for 
the IMF the model is derived from the Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments, 
for the World Bank the underlying model of the programme is a variant of the ‘two-gaps 
growth model’ (Khan et al., 1990). 
The set of reforms and the content of conditionalities devised by the IMF have 
evolved over time. Their limited effectiveness in low-income countries led the IMF to 
launch in 1999 the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), which succeeded the 
ESAF, jointly with the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) of the World Bank, 
with these new facilities hoping to be more effective in insisting on a greater ‘ownership’ 
of conditionalities by borrowing countries. Conditionalities also evolved after the 2008 
global financial crisis. Until the 2008 crisis, conditionalities and their conceptual 
framework had displayed a remarkable stability across countries – developing and 
developed. After the 2008 crisis – and the ensuing Eurozone crisis (and the creation of 
the ‘troika’ and some episodes of divergences with EU own conditionalities) –, the IMF 
recognised the weakness of some of its prescriptions - notably regarding fiscal policy -, 
and of the underlying conceptual framework (e.g. the calculation of the multiplier, 
Blanchard and Leigh, 2013). The IMF recommended ‘parsimony’ (i.e. a focus on 
conditions that are really ‘macro-critical’), flexibility and ‘clarity’ in the specification of 
conditions (IMF, 2012; 2014). It has even been argued that the IMF has taken a 
‘Keynesian’ turn, e.g., considering a fairer social distribution of the burden of fiscal 
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sustainability (e.g. more tax on the richest, IMF, 2013) and more flexibility regarding the 
pace of fiscal consolidation and the composition of fiscal stimulus (Ban, 2014; Ban and 
Gallagher, 2015). 
The IMF reformed its lending and conditionality in 2009 in order to promote 
‘national ownership’ of the prescribed policies (IMF, 2010). While the overarching goal 
remains balance of payments viability and macroeconomic stability, the borrowing 
country is said to have the primary responsibility for selecting, designing, and 
implementing the policies. Compliance is based on a series of mechanisms, i.e. 
disbursements in instalments linked to observable policies, quantitative performance 
criteria and indicative targets, and structural benchmarks (often non-quantifiable reforms) 
(IMF, 2016a). Structural conditionalities have also been reclassified: a key consideration 
here is the likelihood that a condition is ‘macro-critical’ and falls within the areas that the 
IMF considers to be within its core expertise, i.e. macroeconomic stabilisation - fiscal, 
monetary and exchange rate policies, including the underlying institutional arrangements 
and related structural measures, and financial systems issues related to the functioning of 
both domestic and international financial markets. Structural reforms that are aimed at 
strengthening public sector resource management and accountability are here crucial for 
the IMF. The new classification distinguishes the fiscal policy measures (taxation); public 
sector resource management and accountability (public sector governance, transparency 
and financial management); monetary policy, exchange rate policy, accounting, and 
transparency, which are included in the public sector resource management and 
accountability category; public enterprise pricing and privatisation; financial sector 
reforms (IMF, 2009). 
Indeed, the IMF has been criticised by its own auditor (the IMF Independent 
Evaluation Office/IEO) for advising budget cuts to ‘some of the largest advanced 
economies’ like Germany, US and Japan in 2010-2011, and endorsing austerity in a 
‘premature’ way. The IEO acknowledges, however, that observing that after the 2008 
crisis, policies pursued so far did not improve the growth outlook, the IMF has 
reconsidered its fiscal policy prescriptions, calling for a more moderate pace of fiscal 
consolidation and recommending fiscal expansion where it is necessary (IMF-EIO, 2014). 
A review by the IMF of a decade of lending conditionalities – influenced by the problems 
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of the Euro area - , while positively acknowledging that it is more flexible and focused, 
underscored its weakness regarding the ‘ownership’ of programmes and conditions, their 
transparency  and their social consequences (IMF, 2012). The criticisms of conditionality 
had already led to a decrease in numbers of conditions during the 2000s, e.g. on trade 
policies (IMF-IEO, 2009). According to IMF own figures, the number of conditionalities 
decreased since the 2008 crisis (figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Structural conditionality in IMF Stand-by arrangements, 1997-2000 vs. 2008-11 (number of 
conditions per programme per year) 
 
Source: IMF-EIO (2014). 
 
The IMF also displayed adaptability for its facilities and the associated 
conditionalities in developing countries, notably low-income countries. It may also be 
noted that, with higher growth rates during the 2000s, some developing countries (e.g., in 
SSA) were less in need of IMF external financing. The IMF Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility (PRGF) has been replaced in 2010 by new and more flexible lending 
instruments (gathered in the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust/PRGT), which took 
into account the vulnerability of these countries to external shocks, including the major 
shock of the 2008 financial crisis. The PRGT has three lending instruments: the Extended 
Credit Facility to provide flexible medium-term support, with more focused and 
streamlined conditionality; the Standby Credit Facility to address short-term and 
precautionary needs; the Rapid Credit Facility, offering emergency balance-of-payment 
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support without the need for programme-based conditionality1. The IMF has devised a 
non-financial instrument, the Policy Support Instrument (PSI) in order to support low-
income countries that do not want (or need) IMF financial assistance, but seek to 
consolidate their performance with IMF monitoring and support2. Though the objectives 
of the PSI are in line with the IMF ‘traditional’ conceptual framework, by definition they 
do not include the usual conditional lending mechanisms. 
Yet, conditionality remains the centrepiece of the act of borrowing from the IMF. 
The device of ‘lending-conditional-to-reform’ exhibits a remarkable stability, with, 
moreover, much similarity in the content of reforms across borrowing countries, be they 
developing or developed, as shown by the conditionalities attached to the financial rescue 
of Southern Eurozone countries from 2010 onwards (Sindzingre, 2015) – differences 
lying mainly in the types of facilities and arrangements. With the debt problems affecting 
developed economies since the 2008 crisis, this similarity across borrowing countries also 
refers to the repetition of conditionality-based programmes: as has been the case with its 
‘prolonged lending’ over decades to developing countries, the IMF has been described as 
engaged in ‘serial lending’ with some advanced economies (Reinhart and Trebesch, 
2016).  
Indeed, in 2016 as in previous decades, a typical set of reforms prescribed in 
exchange for an IMF loan (to a developing or developed country) thus included fiscal 
reforms and adjustment together with structural reforms (for example, the increase in 
revenue, hiring freeze and control of the wage bill, as for Ghana, IMF, 2016b; cut in 
subsidies, e.g., to fuel, as for Yemen, IMF, 2016c; the raising of taxes, reduction of 
subsidies in the energy sector and privatisation of state-owned enterprises, as for Pakistan, 
IMF, 2016d; deregulation and restructuring state-owned enterprises, as for Ukraine, IMF, 
2015a), public financial management (e.g., debt) and monetary policy (e.g., inflation 
targeting) - conditionalities being monitored via ‘quantitative performance criteria’, 
‘indicative targets’, and ‘macro-critical benchmarks’ (as for Kenya, IMF, 2015b). 
Equally, in order to cope with the important fall in commodity prices of 2016, and the 
                                                          
1 See ‘IMF Support for Low-Income Countries’, 1 April 2016: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/poor.htm 
2 In March 2016, a PSI had been devised for 7 countries, all in SSA. 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/psi.htm 
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subsequent terms-of-trade shock and decline in growth rates, the reforms that the IMF 
recommends to SSA economies consist in, e.g., exchange rate flexibility and reduction of 
fiscal deficits ‘even at the cost of short-term output losses’ (IMF, 2016e: 13).  
Similarly, regarding the Southern Eurozone countries, while the IMF 
acknowledges that ‘regional institutions’ (i.e. the other partners of the ex-‘troika’) had 
‘broader mandates’ than its own and prescribed ‘additional conditions’ (IMF, 2012: 10), 
it still defends structural reforms for, e.g., the labour and product markets (in Greece, for 
example, it defends reforms that were already prescribed more than three decades ago in 
developing countries, such as reduction in the numbers of civil servants and ceilings on 
pensions3). 
 
2. THE INCLUSION OF POLITICAL CONDITIONALITIES IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS’ 
PROGRAMMES  
 
The limited effectiveness of the first stabilisation and adjustment programmes in 
the 1980s led the IFIs to examine causalities that would not be strictly confined to the 
conventional economic determinants of growth and stagnation.  
The 1980s and 1990s precisely witnessed the growing influence in academic 
studies of theories of rent-seeking (Krueger, 1974), bureaucracy’s inefficiency, and 
‘heavy hand’ of government, in the light of rational choice and public choice theories 
(Bates, 1988): states became increasingly held responsible of economic failure. Rent-
seeking behaviour has been said to be even more likely in resources-based economies 
(Auty, 2001), in line with the so-called ‘resource-curse’ arguments. Studies in public 
choice-inspired political economy were enriched by reflections on ‘governance’ 
developed for the analyses of the firm, contracts and regulation, and in developing 
                                                          
3 Poul M. Thomsen: Greece: Toward a Workable Program, IMF Direct, 11 February 2016. https://blog-
imfdirect.imf.org/2016/02/11/greece-toward-a-workable-program 
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countries, typically for the understanding of privatisation’s successes and failures 
(Estache and Wren-Lewis, 2009). 
In the same vein, in order to explain the mixed economic performances of states 
in developing countries, theories in political science and political economy during the 
1980s qualified these states with concepts such as neopatrimonialism, predation, 
corruption, cronyism, nepotism, patronage, clientelism, personal rule, authoritarianism 
(states being said to be, e.g., ‘quasi-states’, ‘kleptocratic’, ‘vampire states’ and the like). 
The argument of ‘extraction’ has been particularly popular, with these economies having 
been analysed as ‘extractive economies’ – an argument that in fact continues Olson’s 
(1993) analyses on the detrimental effects on development of ‘roving bandits’ (vs. 
‘stationary’ ones), as in a world of ‘roving banditry’ there are no incentives to production 
or accumulation. In ‘extractive’ economies, governments typically ground their 
legitimacy on the extraction of natural resources and have no incentive to promote human 
capital, developmental institutions and growth, and they may even have an interest in 
preventing development (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; 2012). 
In the 1990s, many economic studies explored the ‘political economy of policy 
reform’, or theories of ‘endogenous policies’ and of ‘bad policies’, the latter being viewed 
as the key determinants of stagnation. Irrespective of the type of political regime, ‘bad 
policies’ are here viewed as stemming from governments’ inability to use transfers in 
separating efficiency and distribution, and inability to commit credibly – in line with 2004 
Nobel Prize winners Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott (1977) and their argument that 
the credibility of policy and the capacity for a government to credibly commit is crucial 
for these policies’ effectiveness (this argument has been a justification for the creation of 
independent agencies and ‘hand-binding’ devices, e.g., independent central banks). It has 
also been argued, however, that all governments face a problem of credibility for their 
policies, as there is no meta-level above government that has the coercive capacity to 
enforce its policies and promises (Acemoglu, 2003). In this view, political attitudes are 
determined by economic incentives, and the form of political and economic institutions 
results from conflict between groups that have diverging interests (the ‘elites’ and the 
‘citizens’): this endogeneity of political and economic institutions (e.g., the locking-in by 
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oligarchies of financial capital enabling that of human capital) may lead to stagnation 
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). 
This inherent lack of credibility affecting developing countries’ governments 
more than others has thus fed the argument that developing countries’ governments 
should create independent ‘agencies of restraint’ (Collier, 1991) and ‘hand-binding’ 
devices, which would give to their policies and commitments the credibility they lack. As 
mentioned above, for the IFIs conditional lending typically constitutes such a device. 
Indeed, confronted with their programmes’ mixed outcomes, the IFIs have argued that 
policy externalisation is beneficial in predatory states, because in such states policies lack 
credibility, especially external credibility vis-à-vis international markets and investors: 
rulers’ domestic policies must therefore be ‘locked’ by external ‘hand-binding’ devices 
that are costly to renege; such costs are incentives to comply with conditions and reforms, 
and give domestic policies credibility. Examples of such ‘agencies of restraint’ are 
international treaties, regional or monetary arrangements, the allocation of policymaking 
to independent agencies (e.g., central banks, revenue collection agencies) or agreements 
with the IFIs (e.g. stabilisation or adjustment programmes). For the IFIs, such hand-
binding devices are also beneficial for citizens in predatory or dictatorial regimes, as they 
protect them against these regimes’ arbitrariness and clientelism. 
The concept of ‘failed’ states – or ‘fragile’, or ‘collapsed’ states - was also crafted 
within the IFIs and the broader donor community in the 2000s, and was viewed as 
providing a better account of some situations of programme and conditionality failure. 
Such ‘fragile’ states include a significant number of low-income countries, and notably 
SSA countries: e.g., for the Fund for Peace-Foreign Policy Fragile States index, in 2014, 
the worst cases were (in decreasing order) South Sudan, Somalia, Central African 
Republic, Sudan, D.R. Congo, Chad, Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan, Guinea, Iraq, Haiti, 
Pakistan, Nigeria, Zimbabwe,…4 ‘State failure’ has also been explained by initial 
endowments, e.g., geography and demography (which may be endogenous to each other): 
‘state failure’ is indeed the incapacity to provide public goods such law and order, 
defence, contract enforcement, infrastructure, which is typically hindered when 
                                                          
4 Source: Fund For Peace, Fragile States Index 2015: 
http://library.fundforpeace.org/library/fragilestatesindex-2015.pdf  
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demographic densities is low, as is the construction of state authority in the context of 
scattered populations (Herbst, 2000). 
In this theoretical context, from the 1990s onwards, the improvement of recipient 
countries ‘governance’ thus became an additional objective within the IFIs programmes, 
with conditionalities increasingly extended to non-economic issues. The conceptual 
framework keeps the mix of coercion and provision of incentives that characterise 
economic conditionalities. This period witnessed studies within the IFIs that argued that 
aid is effective only in countries that are willing to implement the ‘good policies’ – i.e. in 
fact the conditionalities put forward by IFIs programmes (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; 
2004). Beyond the IFIs, this legitimised for donors the selectivity of their aid flows, i.e. 
aid should be firstly directed towards the countries that show willingness to implement 
conditionalities (the ‘good policies’). An illustration of this extension of economic 
conditionalities to conditionalities regarding governments’ behaviour is the assessment 
by the World Bank, in order to calculate its IDA5 resources allocation, of countries’ 
economic policies and institutions ‘quality’ and their compliance with conditionalities via 
the indicators of the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) (16 criteria 
grouped in 4 clusters: economic management; structural policies; policies for social 
inclusion and equity; and public sector management and institutions)6. 
Hence from the late 1990s onwards, IFI programmes included conditionalities 
related to governance. It may be noted that they focused on administrations and their 
behaviour, and were distinct from other conditionalities, conceived as more ‘economic’, 
which nonetheless usually affect ‘governance’ (e.g., politically influential interest 
groups), such as trade liberalisation. Programmes focused, for example, on corruption, 
accountability, decentralisation and the creation of independent agencies (e.g. for 
improving the levying of taxes), in line with the theories of independent ‘agencies of 
restraint’ as key instruments of policy credibility and hence effectiveness. They also 
focused on the strengthening of ‘democracy’, typically the implementation of elections 
or the support to parliaments. A key issue is that conditionalities on governance are not 
political reform. In putting forward the improvement of ‘governance’, IFIs and other 
                                                          
5 International Development Association, the World Bank’s fund for the poorest countries. 
6 See http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/CPIA 
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donors focus on mechanisms that are presented as technical and a matter of incentives, 
(e.g. involving the functioning of civil services) rather than political. For example, 
‘dysfunctionings’ are identified (by donors or consultancy firms), and donors formulate 
conditions for their financing in terms of technical reform of the management of public 
administration.  
 
3. THE LIMITATIONS OF CONDITIONALITY  
 
Conditionalities, however, are confronted with a series of limitations. Moreover, 
the addition of governance conditionalities to economic conditionalities has induced 
unexpected effects and paradoxes. Though the IFIs conducted several reflections on 
conditionality, e.g., on its time span (short or longer term), it has remained difficult, 
however, for them to question its very existence.  
 
3.1. THE LIMITATIONS INHERENT IN THE MECHANISM OF CONDITIONALITY 
PER SE  
 
Conditionalities multiplied since the first stabilisation and adjustment 
programmes but recipient countries’ economic performances did not markedly improve. 
In the case of SSA for example, there are no clear links between GDP per capita growth 
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Figure 3: Net financial flows from the IBRD and IDA, and net official development assistance 
(billions current US dollars) to Sub-Saharan Africa (left scale) and Sub-Saharan Africa GDP per capita 
growth (right scale), 1960-2014 
 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators, May 2016. IBRD: International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, the part of the World Bank offering non-concessional financing. IDA: 
International Development Association, the part of the World Bank offering concessional financing to the 
poorest countries. 
 
When they improved, such as in SSA countries in the second half of the 2000s, 
this was, in fact, due less to the implementation of conditionalities than to these countries’ 
dependence on commodities (precisely the key factor of their fiscal problems and hence 
their need for IFI conditional lending): i.e. this was due to the increase in international 
commodity prices in the 2000s. As shown by figure 4, in SSA growth rates have closely 
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Figure 4: Growth rate of Sub-Saharan Africa GDP (right scale) and energy and non-energy 
prices indices (2010=100, 2005 US dollars) (left scale), 1960-2015 
 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators, and World Bank Commodity Price Data 
(‘pink sheet’: http://go.worldbank.org/4ROCCIEQ50), April 2016. 
 
Indeed, in commodity-dependent economies, the reform programmes that started 
in the early-1980s did not modify the root cause of fiscal crises, i.e. vulnerability to 
external shocks due to a distorted export structure that is based on primary commodities 
with volatile prices. Behind higher growth rates during the 2000s, the economic structures 
that generated the dependence on conditional-to-reform lending and the associated 
externalisation of domestic policies have remained unchanged. These improvements are 
vulnerable to any reversal of the international environment, the latter being obviously out 
of the control of borrowing governments’ domestic policies - e.g., China’s growth 
deceleration or the fall in commodity prices from 2014 onwards.  
Equally, the argument that IFI conditional-to-reform lending provides borrowing 
governments’ policies with credibility vis-à-vis international and domestic agents is not 
confirmed. For some studies, IMF conditionality appears to be ineffective, and there is 
no empirical evidence showing that conditionalities have enhanced recipient countries’ 
‘ownership’ (Dreher, 2008). It has even been argued that IMF programmes have a 
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Moreover, for a country the mere fact of having signed a reform programme with the IMF 
in exchange for financing can even be a negative signal for international investors 
(Thacker, 1999). When conditionalities appear to be effective, there seems to be a 
tautological process that conditionalities are effective mostly in countries that show 
willingness to reform (Wei and Zhang, 2010) – which may question the argument that 
conditionality should be abandoned in favour of selectivity, i.e. lending to governments 
that already have ‘good’ policies and institutions.  
A justification of conditionalities is that financing cannot be given without 
programmes of economic reforms and conditions, as otherwise money would line private 
and corrupt pockets. The World Bank has consistently justified its adjustment 
programmes in arguing that privatisation and liberalisation break the rents that 
characterise developing countries, especially the rents of political rulers and the 
monopolies of the interest groups and oligarchs thus rewarded in exchange for political 
support. A similar argument is that without conditions money would be wasted in 
inefficient policies: conditions oblige governments to make a use of financing that pave 
the way of future growth, and projects that yield profit or social welfare.  
These arguments, however, do not always hold: conditionalities may indeed 
destabilise anti-developmental rulers and oligarchs, but the latter can sometimes adapt 
them to their own advantage. Equally, the argument that conditionalities channel the lent 
money in a way that is more economically efficient may not be valid, as argued by a large 
‘heterodox’ literature since the first stabilisation and adjustment programmes in the 
1980s. In developing countries, from the 1980s onwards, several studies pointed at the 
failures of the design, the fallacies of the underlying theories and the inadequacy of 
conditionalities to borrowing countries’ characteristics (Mosley et al., 1991; Taylor, 
1993; Adelman, 2001). Both regarding developing countries and developed countries 
(e.g. in the EU after 2010 and the ex-‘troika’ programmes), such studies argue that these 
conditionalities are not conducive to growth and actually aggravate countries’ 
macroeconomic problems, e.g. debt and fiscal deficits, and, for developing countries, do 
not foster structural transformation and departure from commodity-dependence and aid-
dependence. Since the 2008 crisis, even non-‘heterodox’ economists have underscored 
that the economic content of conditions – macroeconomic stabilisation, the standard 
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Washington consensus, i.e. reduction of fiscal imbalances, privatisation, liberalisation -, 
are not credible regarding their aims of restoring growth (Wyplosz, 2013; O’Rourke, 
2014). 
In addition, the externalisation of policies and the very mechanism of 
conditionality inherently generate resistance from governments (e.g., policy reversal) and 
citizens, and may induce endless detrimental games and moral hazard effects 
(conditionality may also be impossible to implement). The focus of IFI programmes on 
‘ownership’ and ‘participation’ of recipient governments, together with the notion of 
‘partnership’ put forward as a description of the relationship between the donor and the 
recipient, stumble over the intrinsic asymmetry of the relationship: one party finances and 
exchanges its financing for compulsory reform and the other is in need for financing and 
has no other choice than to accept this relationship. An IMF Independent Evaluation 
Office’s assessment observed that in 2007 only about half of the structural conditions 
were complied with on time (IMF-EIO, 2007), which contradicts the objective and 
requirement of ‘ownership’ and internalisation of reforms. Over decades of lending and 
mixed results, the relationships between IFIs and governments have been described as a 
‘ritual dance’ (Kahler, 1992), with some ‘aid fatigue’ on both sides, and as a ‘game’ with 
permanent negotiations - politics of recipient countries have even been coined the 
‘politics of non-reform’ (Van de Walle, 2001). 
Conditionality indeed implies and highlights the inherent divergence of interests 
and asymmetry between the finance-providing IFIs (or other donors) and the finance-
receiving government (including other social groups in the receiving country). Aid is 
typically affected by the ‘Samaritan dilemma’ (Gibson et al., 2005): e.g., if the recipient 
government knows that donors condition their aid on a reduction of poverty, it has little 
incentive to exert high effort toward this objective, as in doing so it will receive less aid 
in the future. The ‘Samaritan’s dilemma’ is aggravated by moral hazard: the donor can 
never know if a poor outcome is the result of low effort (‘bad policies’) or ‘bad luck’ 
(Svensson, 2005). Rulers may also exploit policy externalisation in order to stay in power: 
e.g., using the IFIs and their conditionalities as ‘scapegoats’ (Vreeland, 1999), 
manipulating conditionalities in order to put forward their own policies and interests, or 
practicing ‘double-edge diplomacy’ (Putnam, 1988). On their side, aid agencies may not 
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enforce conditions, due to their own institutional incentives to lend (or make grants). It 
has thus been argued that the device of conditionality has in fact contributed to the erosion 
of the credibility of the IMF vis-à-vis borrowing countries (notably the credibility of the 
IMF threat of sanctioning non-compliance) due to the dual role of the IMF as a creditor 
and a monitor of reform (Marchesi and Sabani, 2007). More generally conditionality has 
contributed to the erosion of the effectiveness and legitimacy of IMF policies, even if 
their objective is growth. 
This policy ineffectiveness may perpetuate aid dependence (Sindzingre, 2012), 
which is detrimental per se – due to, e.g., Dutch disease effects of aid or to its volatility 
(Bulir and Hamann, 2008). Indeed, since the 1980s, some SSA countries depend on 
external aid for basic public goods such as infrastructure, health or education. Net official 
development assistance (ODA) to SSA represented in 2014 2.8% of GNI, 12.6% of gross 
capital formation and 7.8% of imports of goods, services and income7. Besides the small 
island economies of Oceania, SSA is the region of the world that is the most dependent 
on aid. This poor performance is driven by SSA low-income countries: the ratio net 
ODA/GNI is by far the highest for low-income countries as a category – 8.8% in 2014 – 










                                                          
7 Source: World Bank World Development Indicators, 2016, table 6.11. 
http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/6.11 
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Figure 5: Net Official Development Assistance (ODA) received in percentage of Gross National 
Income (GNI), 1960-2014 
 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators, May 2016. 
 
 
3.2. THE LIMITATIONS OF CONDITIONALITIES ON GOVERNANCE AND THE 
INHERENT LINKS BETWEEN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL 
CONDITIONALITIES  
 
Since the 1980s, in many developing countries, the implementation of 
conditionalities has not produced tangible outcomes for citizens in terms of standard of 
living, inequality or corruption. The implementation of ‘good governance’ programmes 
has often been confined to reforms of the form of institutions, e.g. the introduction of 
elections, of agencies of restraint, e.g. for tax, the drafting of constitutions, etc. Similarly, 
the same oligarchies have kept the power, and in some countries, whatever the donors’ 
governance conditionalities, whatever the formal democratic institutions (elections, 
parliaments, anti-corruption agencies) rulers could remain decades in power, with no 
visible opposition from donors when they formally implemented IFIs programmes.  
In addition, geopolitical motives may drive IFI loans. Aid is typically a dimension 
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corrupt, the more democratic or the poorest (Alesina and Weder, 2002; Easterly and 
Williamson, 2011; Deaton, 2013). ‘Good governance’ conditionalities may here clash 
with other priorities, which can contribute to the weakening of the credibility of 
governance requirements for the citizens of recipient countries. Donors here reveal that 
they do not always believe themselves in these conditionalities and may forget that 
conditionalities are not complied with when other ‘superior’ interests are at stake – 
typically regarding their own foreign policy. Recipient countries’ citizens may therefore 
also not believe donors when they recommend these conditionalities. 
Also, the fact that reforms centre mostly on institutional forms and do not address 
the structure of local political economy explains that these conditionalities cannot be 
effective: this ineffectiveness in terms of, e.g., inequality and voicing of citizens also 
contributes to the lack of credibility of ‘good governance’ conditionalities for recipient 
countries citizens. 
Here IFIs are trapped by their own organisation and conceptual frameworks: the 
fact that they devised a concept of ‘good governance’ that is primarily technical due to 
their Articles of Agreement, prevents the IFIs from intruding in the domestic politics of 
their members (as borrowing countries are IMF members), despite the fact that 
conditionalities by definition impinge on political economy and that ‘governance’ is 
intrinsically a political concept, which refers to the core of political economy – corruption, 
inequality – of a government and public administration. This ex ante prevents the 
conditionalities attached to the concept of governance to be effective, if they are confined 
to forms, e.g. changing organisational charts, providing incentives, but not touching core 
political structures and their historical determinants. Donors may also be trapped in the 
‘double edge diplomacy’ of local rulers, which always have two divergent agendas, one 
internal, e.g., staying in power, and one for the external, e.g., donors or investors. 
The ‘governance’ conditionalities exhibit several contradictions. Good 
governance has to be endogenous, internalised, as, e.g. ‘participation, ‘ownership’ cannot 
by definition be prescribed. ‘Ownership’ contradicts with the intrinsic asymmetry of the 
lending relationship (likely to generate resistances). ‘Good governance’ cannot come 
from the outside, as prescriptions from external agencies are ‘processed’ by local norms: 
these prescriptions are external inputs and are necessarily retransformed according to 
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local political and social norms and by various groups and interests. ‘Institutions’ are 
indeed composite entities and result from complex combinations of economic, political, 
social elements (Sindzingre, 2007). 
Moreover, the combination of economic and governance conditionalities may be 
self-contradictory and generate a series of paradoxes. Political conditionalities, 
participation, democracy, may contradict with the IFIs economic conditionalities. The 
requirements by donors in the 1990s of the simultaneous implementation of economic 
reform and political reform (democratisation) often had detrimental effects, typically the 
generation of political business cycles (e.g., fiscal deficits created by the costs of 
elections) in countries in fiscal problems, and hence the aggravation of these problems 
while IFIs require countries to reduce their fiscal deficits. The injunction of compliance 
with economic and political conditionalities is a ‘double bind’ for recipient rulers in low-
income countries with limited resources: requirements of democracy are costly in 
developing countries given a pervasive context of patronage politics and clientelist 
redistribution that are difficult to break, and they may therefore increase fiscal deficits 
that other conditionalities require to reduce (Williamson, 1994). Here, in the context of 
the asymmetry of the conditionality relationship, a recurrent solution for developing 
countries’ governments is to ask donors for more aid for implementing the ‘good 
governance’ reforms: donors thus typically finance these governance’ reforms, e.g., 
elections, the functioning of agencies created for improving accountability, transparency, 
the training and equipment of customs and tax administrations. Equally, in countries 
under assistance programmes, it is typically donors who finance fiscal deficits, e.g. via 
budget support, while conditionality on spending makes it so that education or health are 
sacrificed by rulers in favour of more discretionary spending driven by their political 
interests and the local political economy (and usually indifferent to citizens’ welfare) – 
health and education becoming funded via multiple projects from a great number of 
external donors (which generate detrimental coordination problems that weaken public 
policies effectiveness, which in turn fosters the need for external financial support). In 
fine, the asymmetry of aid dependence and conditional financial support (loans or grants), 
and their detrimental consequences, perpetuate themselves in vicious circles. 
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Also, economic conditionalities in their quest for being effective may bypass 
democratic institutions, typically constitutions and parliaments. The latter may vote 
against certain conditionalities (e.g., the layoff of civil servants, which is part of 
stabilisation programmes in both developed and developing countries), but this is likely 
to be ignored by programmes. Yet the effective functioning of such institutions – 
parliaments, rule of law - is precisely an important dimension of governance 
conditionalities (Sindzingre, 2014). 
Sanctions and conditionalities that are not complied with may also generate 
paradoxical and unexpected effects. Firstly, as in any binding arrangement in 
international relations, sanctions of non-compliance reflect the balance of power 
relationships of the parties of the arrangement: the implementation of sanctions depends 
on the geopolitical importance of the non-complying countries. This is shown not only 
by arrangements with the IFIs, but, as is well-known, by the compliance with fiscal rules 
of EU member countries: sanctions appear difficult against the most important founding 
members8 while explicit political power relationships, the toughest sanctions and even 
‘financial asphyxia’9 are chosen vis-à-vis the weakest countries if lenders and borrowers 
openly express their divergence on the policies they want to implement (as in Greece in 
2015). 
Secondly, as is often the case in low-income commodity-dependent countries, 
conditionalities are not complied with not always because governments do not want it, 
but because they cannot do it, e.g., as countries may be caught in a poverty trap combining 
very limited fiscal resources, strong interest groups and generalised corruption: getting 
out of such stabilised low equilibria is very difficult, and even if governments adhere to 
and wish to apply programmes’ conditionalities, they may be powerless (Sindzingre and 
Milelli, 2010).  
Thirdly, economic sanctions, e.g., stops in disbursements or suspension of 
projects, aggravate countries’ economic problems, and therefore may make compliance 
still more unlikely (as has been the case for some EU member countries that after the 
                                                          
8 See for example ‘Pierre Moscovici rejects economic sanctions for member states’ (Euractiv, 2014).  
9 Romaric Godin, ‘Europe: l’échec de la stratégie du ‘containment’’ (Europe: the failure of ‘containment’ 
strategy), La Tribune, 26 May 2015. http://www.latribune.fr/economie/union-europeenne/europe-l-echec-
de-la-strategie-du-containment-478798.html 
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2008 crisis did not comply with the thresholds on debt and fiscal deficit). Similarly, 
sanctions for non compliance with ‘good governance’ are usually a cut in aid flows from 
the IFIs and other donors: for example, in triggering a stop in aid flows, a military coup 
may plunge a country in deeper economic difficulties (even if this would have the positive 
aspect of a diminution of aid dependence) and it may not necessarily foster a better 
governance, e.g. more aspiration to democracy or lesser corruption10. An example is the 
US African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which grants unilateral trade 
preferences to SSA countries and includes conditionalities on governance – suspension 
of preferences may with time constrain rulers to implement policies aiming at democracy 
or rule of law, but these may remain mainly formal (e.g. limited to elections or to the 
creation of anti-corruption agencies). The Generalised System of Preferences ‘plus’ 
(GSP+) of the EU also includes provisions on governance, and for a developing country 
not having them means a privation of resources. In poor countries, however, which are 
caught in the vicious circle of aid-dependence, these types of sanctions may less affect 
the rulers than the poor.  
Regarding bilateral donors, such unexpected and negative effects can also 
characterise the mechanisms of selectivity of aid, of the conditioning of financing to the 
willingness to implement ‘good policies’. The withdrawal of financial support by donors 
is indeed likely to affect the poor more than the elites in some countries, and this is even 
more the case as many countries that are unwilling or unable to implement programmes 
are undemocratic or authoritarian political regimes where citizens are voiceless. Also, the 
selectivity mechanism has difficulties in functioning at the concrete level, as donors may 
be driven by their interests or ideology (Brech and Potrafke, 2014). 
Finally, throughout history, state-building has relied on centralisation and 
accountability (Tilly, 1985). The ‘good governance’ agenda and conditionalities do not 
modify the general framework of poor countries fiscal dependence on external flows. This 
dependence generates problems of accountability and legitimacy. Aid dependence fosters 
‘policy externalisation’ - to agencies that are external to the government and condition 
financing to policy -, which is a key constraint on the effectiveness of recipient countries’ 
public policies and institutions, as it erodes their legitimacy and credibility, in particular 
                                                          
10 Embargoes are well-known examples of such lacks of impact or even perverse effects at the local level. 
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tax institutions (Moss et al., 2006). When domestic policies are devised by external 
agencies and when rulers are more accountable to these external agencies than their own 
citizens because they get their resources from these agencies rather than from citizens via 
taxation, this breaks the link between rulers and citizens established by taxation and 
redistribution, and the citizens’ consensus that underlie state legitimacy. Indeed, 
accountability of rulers to citizens is a central element of state formation, notably via the 
mechanisms of taxation and redistribution (Kaldor, 1963), and a central element of the 
effectiveness of their policies; it is a central element of legitimacy of political regimes 
and institutions, notably of delegation (democracy), as otherwise citizens feel unable to 
weigh on domestic policies and deprived of ‘voice’. In this context, the ‘good governance’ 
paradigm may be viewed as more an ‘outsourcing of state authority’ than state-building 
(Meagher, 2014). The paradoxical and unexpected effects here are that an effectively 
functioning state is necessary for economic conditions and reforms to be implemented. 
  
       WP 142 / 2016 
 
 





This paper has analysed the concept of conditionality in developing countries, 
under the two forms of economic conditionalities and conditionalities applied to 
‘governance’. It has shown its limitations, both in terms of conceptual rigour and policy 
feasibility, as well as the commonalities and differences between the two regimes of 
conditionalities. In particular, it has highlighted the trapping processes for donors (e.g., 
addressing political issues via technical instruments), but also for recipients (e.g., the 
trapping in repeated asymmetric games of ‘donor’ conditionality and ‘recipient’ 
resistance), as well as the unexpected effects and paradoxes that are associated with 
conditionalities. The demonstration of these inherent flaws and detrimental consequences 
is crucial both at the theoretical and policy levels, as conditionality is remarkably resilient 
- i.e. the devices of conditional lending, ‘exchange of finance for reforms’ and ‘policy 
externalisation’ that in fact means a massive intrusion in and control of domestic policies. 
Even after decades of failure in developing countries, conditionality remains the only 
mechanism that is used by all international lending institutions, as shown by ex-troika 
management of the economic difficulties of Eurozone’s Southern countries from 2010 
onwards. 
Several questions require further analysis, in particular as to whether it would be 
possible to finance development without conditions. Many attempts at changing have 
been made by the IFIs and other donors since the 2000s, e.g., budget support, ex-post 
monitoring, output-based lending, evidence-based lending, among others. Ex post or ex 
ante, however, conditions to financing remain an intrinsic element of conceptual 
frameworks (Dixit, 2000). Some bilateral donors’ development cooperation, e.g. China, 
is reputed to include little conditionality (‘non interference’): this may not last as China 
becomes a major player, e.g. in SSA (Grimm, 2014), and in addition such stance may not 
be possible for international financial institutions.  
In addition, another question would be whether it is desirable to finance 
development without conditions. Indeed, regarding China, the ‘non interference’ 
principle has been subject to criticism, as a support for political regimes that may be 
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illegitimate, thus showing that governance conditionality could bring positive outcomes 
in terms of political economy of development processes. Also, the suppression of 
conditionalities would require the complete reshuffling of the existing conceptual and 
policy framework elaborated by donors, and of the political economy of borrowing 
countries: i.e. the end of the repeated games associated with aid dependence, between 
lenders and borrowers, between donors and governments (and between rulers and 
citizens), between conditionalities and resistance. This may be desirable, but may not be 
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